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Abstract. In his so-called Argument from Consciousness (AC), J.P. moreland 
argues that the phenomenon of consciousness furnishes us with evidence for 
the existence of God. In defending AC, however, moreland makes claims that 
generate an undesirable tension. This tension can be posed as a dilemma based 
on the contingency of the correlation between mental and physical states. The 
correlation of mental and physical states is either contingent or necessary. If 
the correlation is contingent then epiphenomenalism is true. If the correlation 
is necessary then a  theistic explanation for the correlation is forfeit. both are 
unwelcome results for AC.
I. INtroDuCtIoN
recently J.P. moreland (1998, 2003, 2008) has argued that non-physical 
mental states – their existence and correlation with physical states – 
provide evidence for the existence of God. He regiments his argument 
as follows:
1. Genuinely nonphysical mental states exist.
2. There is an explanation for the existence of mental states.
3. Personal explanation is different from natural scientific explanation.
4. The explanation for the existence of mental states is either personal 
or natural scientific.
5. The explanation is not natural scientific.
6. Therefore the explanation is personal.
7. If the explanation is personal then it is theistic.
8. Therefore the explanation is theistic.
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The so-called Argument from Consciousness (AC) is essentially a God-
of-the-gaps argument. That is, a putative gap in our scientific knowledge 
regarding nonphysical mental states is taken to be evidence for the 
existence of God.
AC rests on a number of contentious premises. Premise (1) is at the 
heart of several heated debates in contemporary philosophy of mind. 
many working in this area of philosophy are physicalists1 and they reject 
(1). moreland, though he offers a set of ‘standard’ reasons in support of 
(1), states up front that he does not intend to give a  rigorous defense. 
Instead he assumes the truth of (1) ‘for the sake of argument.’ This is not 
an insignificant point because it clearly demarcates the target audience of 
AC - naturalists who countenance nonphysical mental states.2 I will refer 
to the members of this target audience as naturalistic dualists. moreland’s 
hope is that AC will persuade naturalistic dualists to become theists.
Another contentious premise is (5). moreland offers four reasons in 
defense of this premise: (a) the uniformity of nature, (b) the contingency of 
the mind-body correlation, (c) the rejection of epiphenomenalism based 
on causal closure, and (d) the inadequacy of evolutionary explanations. 
Though there are important things to be said regarding each of these 
reasons, careful reflection on reasons (b) and (c) in particular gives rise 
to an unpalatable tension in moreland’s defense of AC. The remainder 
of this paper will be devoted to developing this tension into a dilemma.
II. reASoN (b): rADICAl CoNtINGeNCY
one reason there is no natural scientific explanation for mental states, 
moreland argues, is because the correlation between mental states and 
physical states is ‘radically contingent’. This reason is really composed 
of two parts: an epistemological part involving the term ‘radical’ and 
a metaphysical part involving the term ‘contingent’. to begin, consider 
what moreland means when he says that the mental-physical correlation 
is radically contingent. He writes:
1 Some notable contemporary physicalists are Jaegwon Kim (2000, 2005) and David 
Papineau (2002).
2 A notable contemporary naturalistic dualist is David Chalmers (1996, 2010).
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Why do pains instead of itches, thoughts or feelings of love get correlated 
with specific brain states? No amount of knowledge of the brain state will 
help to answer this question. For the naturalist, the regularity of mind-
body correlations must be taken as contingent brute facts. (moreland 
2003, p. 208, my emphasis)
moreland is making an epistemological claim. because the mental-
physical correlation is radically contingent ‘no amount of knowledge’ 
of the brain can explain why certain mental states are correlated with 
certain brain states. All that can be said, as committed naturalists, is that 
this brain state is correlated with that mental state - end of story. As such 
there is no natural scientific explanation forthcoming. In the absence of 
an explanation, naturalistic dualists are left to baldly announce that the 
correlations are brute facts of nature.
to simply assert that the correlations are brute facts of nature, however, 
begs the question against theistic dualists like moreland who claim to 
have an explanation for the correlations. This is where the second part of 
reason (b) comes into play. The correlation between mental and physical 
states is radically contingent. to say that the correlation is contingent is 
to make a metaphysical claim. It is to claim that there are possible worlds 
where mental and physical states come apart in various ways. let’s call 
this claim Contingency. moreland describes some of these possible 
worlds as follows:
For example, given a specific brain state normally ‘associated’ with the 
mental state of being appeared to redly, inverted qualia worlds (worlds with 
that physical state but radically different mental states ‘associated’ with 
it), zombie worlds (worlds with that physical state and no mental states 
at all), and disembodied worlds (worlds with beings possessing mental 
states with no physical entities at all) are still metaphysically possible. 
(moreland 2003, p. 213)
Asserting Contingency, therefore, commits one, among other things, to 
the possibility of inverted qualia worlds, zombie worlds, and disembodied 
worlds.
Contingency is critical to reason (b) because it makes room for 
a personal explanation of the correlation between mental and physical 
states. In effect it provides a foundation on which premise (6) of AC can 
be grounded. moreland writes:
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… the fact that the existence of consciousness and its precise correlation 
with matter is contingent fits well with a  theistic personal explanation 
that takes God’s creative action to have been a contingent one. God may 
be a  necessary being, but God’s choice to create conscious beings and 
to correlate certain types of mental states with certain types of physical 
states were contingent choices, and this fits nicely with the phenomena 
themselves. (moreland 2003, p. 208, my emphasis)
Not only does Contingency ‘fit well’ with a personal explanation it seems 
that Contingency is required for a personal explanation. This is because 
offering a  theistic personal explanation of a  given phenomenon seems 
to presuppose the contingency of the phenomenon to be explained. 
This is especially so given moreland’s construal of God as an agent with 
libertarian freedom. He writes, “God is free to act or refrain from acting in 
various ways.” That is, the explanandum of a theistic personal explanation 
must be contingent since it depends on God’s free choice. There must 
be some possible worlds that give content to the claim that God chose 
to render the relevant phenomenon in a certain way and other possible 
worlds that give content to the claim that God chose not to render the 
relevant phenomenon in a certain way. For consider what it would be like 
to offer a theistic personal explanation for the mind-body correlation if 
the correlation were necessary. That is, what if there were no possible 
worlds where the relevant mental and physical states come apart? What, 
then, would the prospects be for offering a personal explanation of the 
correlation in terms of God’s choice when there are no possible worlds to 
make sense of God’s ability to do otherwise? The prospects do not seem 
promising.
Perhaps the same point can be made more clearly by borrowing an 
image from Kripke (1972). Suppose we imagine God creating the world. 
What does God need to do after he creates everything physical in the 
world? If Contingency is true it seems God is now faced with a myriad 
of choices. God must decide which mental states to correlate with the 
various brain states that have already been created. He must decide 
whether or not to correlate an itch with this brain state, a pain with that 
brain state, and so on. because, according to Contingency, there are no 
necessary connections between mental and physical states it is easy to see 
why a theistic personal explanation for the correlations ‘fits well’ with the 
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phenomena. but imagine what it would be like if the correlation between 
mental and physical states were necessary. When God finishes creating 
everything physical he would have nothing left to do regarding the 
mental since there is a necessary correlation between mental and physical 
states. God’s creating the physical would automatically bring the mental 
into existence as well. rejecting Contingency, therefore, would seriously 
undermine the plausibility of offering a theistic personal explanation for 
the mental-physical correlation.
The upshot is that Contingency is critical for the success of AC. 
A theistic personal explanation for the mind-body correlation requires 
Contingency. Without this moreland’s argument falters in its main 
objective - convincing others that a theistic personal explanation of the 
mind-body correlation is preferable over a natural scientific explanation.
III. reASoN (C): tHe FAlSItY oF ePIPHeNomeNAlISm
Another reason there is no natural scientific explanation for mental states, 
moreland argues, is because naturalism, at least the dualist varieties, is 
false. Naturalistic dualism is false because: naturalists are committed 
to Closure (the causal closure of the physical domain), Closure entails 
epiphenomenalism, and epiphenomenalism is false. moreland writes:
… epiphenomenalism is false. mental causation seems undeniable... [as 
such] the admission of epiphenomenal nonphysical mental entities may 
be taken as a refutation of naturalism. (moreland 2003, p. 209)
The idea is straightforward. If a theory entails epiphenomenalism then 
that theory is false and any false theory is precluded from providing 
legitimate explanations. It follows that naturalistic dualism is false since 
naturalistic dualism entails epiphenomenalism. Consequently there can 
be no natural scientific explanations that are derived from naturalistic 
dualism.
let me take things a bit slower. Closure is the claim that physical events 
only have physical causes. moreland describes Closure as follows:
… when one is tracing the causal antecedents of any physical event, one 
will never have to leave the level of the physical. Physical effects have only 
physical causes… (moreland 2003, p. 209)
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Closure eliminates the possibility of nonphysical entities having causal 
effects in the physical world. This poses a serious problem for naturalistic 
dualists. because naturalistic dualists are committed to naturalism they 
are obliged to accept Closure, or so moreland claims. because naturalistic 
dualists are also committed to the nonphysical nature of mental states 
according to premise (1) of AC, naturalistic dualists are obliged, in light of 
Closure, to accept epiphenomenalism. Consequently naturalistic dualists 
must also accept epiphenomenalism. but if epiphenomenalism is false, as 
moreland rightly asserts, it follows that naturalistic dualism must be false. 
As a result the possibility of securing a natural scientific explanation for 
mental states within the framework of naturalistic dualism is forfeited.
The claim that Closure entails epiphenomenalism, I  realize, is 
controversial.3 my purpose in rehearsing moreland’s logic is not to get 
embroiled in the debates over mental causation. It is simply to highlight 
moreland’s insistence on this entailment along with his insistence that 
epiphenomenalism is false.
Assuming explanation refers to the claim that there is a  theistic 
personal explanation for the mind-body correlation, the critical elements 
of my discussion of AC thus far can be summarized with the following 
three claims:
C1: explanation → Contingency
C2: Naturalistic Dualism → epiphenomenalism
C3: ~epiphenomenalism
C1, captured as a  conditional, is the claim that a  theistic personal 
explanation of the mind-body correlation requires the contingency of 
the mental-physical correlation. C2, also captured as a conditional, is the 
claim that naturalistic dualism, given its commitment to Closure, entails 
epiphenomenalism. C3 is simply the rejection of epiphenomenalism.
IV. ZombIeS AND ePIPHeNomeNAlISm: A DIlemmA
There is, however, a tension in moreland’s development and defense of 
AC. His rejection of epiphenomenalism is at odds with his commitment 
3 many contemporary non-reductive physicalists committed to Closure argue that 
mental states, despite being irreducible with respect to fundamental physical states, are 
causally efficacious. For interesting discussions on this see Kim (2000, 2005), Crisp & 
Warfield (2001), and bennett (2003).
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to Contingency because Contingency, as I  will argue, actually entails 
epiphenomenalism. This claim can be captured as a further conditional.
C4: Contingency → epiphenomenalism
to see why C4 is true consider the ‘standard’ way of characterizing 
zombies.4 A zombie is someone or something physically identical to 
me (or any other conscious being), but lacking conscious experiences 
altogether. my zombie twin is molecule-for-molecule identical to me 
(down to the low-level properties of physics) but without conscious 
experiences. If we assume that my zombie twin is also embedded in 
a physically identical world he will be identical to me functionally and 
behaviorally. If I yell ‘ouch’ from a burned finger my zombie-twin will 
also yell ‘ouch’. Whatever I do my zombie twin will also do. my zombie 
twin and I are indistinguishable in terms of our behavior and physical 
structure down to the final detail.
According to Contingency zombie worlds like the one just described 
are possible. What does the possibility of a zombie world imply about the 
causal efficacy of mental states? Consider a possible world PWZ. PWZ is 
a zombie world. As such PWZ is physically identical to PW@, the actual 
world, in every minute physical detail. every physical event that occurs 
in PW@ also occurs in PWZ. The only difference between PWZ and PW@ 
is that there are no mental states in PWZ. Since there are no mental states 
in PWZ it follows that every physical event in PWZ will have a  causal 
explanation that is independent of any mental state. take for instance the 
physical event, call it E, of my yelling ‘ouch’ after getting burned. E occurs 
in both PW@ and PWZ. What is the cause of E in PWZ? Presumably it is 
some physical brain state, call it P, in my zombie twin. P causes E in PWZ. 
What does this tell us of the relevant causal relations in PW@? In PW@ 
I am also in physical brain state P and I also yell ‘ouch’. That is, both P and 
E occur in PW@. The critical difference is that I am also in mental state M 
in PW@. but what is the causal status of M with regard to E?
Here it seems we have a  situation that is ripe for applying mill’s 
Difference method5 (or something like it). let’s assume we can control all 
the relevant variables when running two experiments, one with potential 
causal factors A and B and another experiment, ceteris paribus, with only 
4 For more on zombies see Chalmers (1996, 2010).
5 For a good discussion of mill’s Difference method see chapter 2 of Psillos (2002).
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A. both experiments yield effect C. Given these results it seems we can 
safely conclude that B is causally irrelevant, or epiphenomenal, with regard 
to C. Since C continues to occur, ceteris paribus, even in the absence of B 
we know that B cannot be a cause of C. In the same way, returning to the 
mental-physical case, since E continues to occur, ceteris paribus, even in 
the absence of M in PWZ we know that E’s occurring in PW@ has nothing 
to do with M either. This shows that Contingency, because it entails the 
possibility of zombie worlds, leads to epiphenomenalism.
moreland is now faced with an uneasy tension. According to C1 
moreland must be committed to Contingency in order to make a theistic 
personal explanation for the mental-physical correlation possible. 
According to C4, however, a  commitment to Contingency leads to 
epiphenomenalism. but moreland, according to C3, rightly rejects 
epiphenomenalism. A dilemma can now be formulated.
9. moreland must accept or reject Contingency.
10. If he accepts Contingency then he must also accept 
epiphenomenalism.
11. If he rejects Contingency then he must also reject explanation.
Contingency must either be accepted or rejected. If Contingency is 
accepted proponents of AC are forced to accept epiphenomenalism. If 
Contingency is rejected proponents of AC are forced to forfeit explanation. 
essentially moreland is left with two choices: accept epiphenomenalism 
or forfeit explanation. both options are undesirable.
V. AN obJeCtIoN
one way of avoiding the dilemma is to reject C4: Contingency → 
epiphenomenalism. Just because zombie worlds demonstrate that 
everything physical in PWZ can go on just as it does in PW@ in the absence 
of mental states it does not follow that mental states are epiphenomenal. 
Isn’t it possible for mental states to be causally efficacious in PW@ and 
still have everything physical in PWZ go on just as it does in PW@ in the 
absence of mental states so long as PWZ is a counter-nomological world? 
That is, so long as the laws of nature in PWZ differ from the laws of nature 
in PW@?
let’s assume that mental states are casually efficacious in the actual 
world. It is the conjunction of my mental state and my brain state that 
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bring about my yelling ‘ouch’. That is, M and P together cause E in PW@: 
M & P → E. If, however, M makes a causal difference regarding E in PW@ 
then, ceteris paribus, it seems E should not obtain in PWZ since M is 
absent. but one might argue that E can still obtain in the absence of M 
if we consider a  different possible zombie world PWZ-LAW. In PWZ-LAW, 
unlike PWZ, the laws of nature differ from the laws of nature in PW@. 
PWZ-LAW is a counter-nomological world. Perhaps there is a law of nature 
in PW@ that ensures E is brought about only by the conjunction of M 
and P. In PWZ-LAW, however, there is a different law of nature - one that 
ensures P brings about E, even in the absence of M: P → E. So we have 
a possible world, namely PWZ-LAW, that seems to demonstrate the falsity 
of Contingency → epiphenomenalism.
There are at least two things to be said in response to this. First, it 
is unclear whether or not we can say that the identity of physical brain 
state P is preserved when considering P in both PW@ and PWZ-lAW. more 
generally, it is unclear whether physical identity is preserved across 
counter-nomological worlds.6 take, for example, the proton. Protons 
have a certain causal profile in the actual world. It is possible, however, 
for protons to take on different causal profiles in counter-nomological 
worlds. Perhaps protons could take on the causal profile of an actual 
world electron and still maintain their identity as protons. but this very 
possibility – the possibility that a  proton could behave exactly like an 
electron, yet remain a proton – is bizarre by my lights.
Furthermore this position leads to an unparsimonious proliferation 
of possibilities. For every possible world we had once entertained we 
would have to include a  vast number (perhaps an infinite number) of 
new possibilities. We would be forced to countenance a new possibility 
for each possible assignment of causal profiles to the various physical 
entities. All such possible worlds will be indistinguishable with respect to 
each other. That is, they will be empirically equivalent worlds. The laws of 
nature in these worlds will be indistinguishable and all the experiments 
that work in the actual world will proceed in exactly the same way in these 
6 For more on this debate see bird (2005, 2007) and ellis (2001). bird poses the 
question in terms of essential or contingent causal profiles. Those who claim that causal 
profiles are contingent he calls Categoricalists and those who claim that causal profiles are 
essential he calls Dispositional essentialists. ellis provides compelling reasons to reject 
categoricalism.
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worlds. Nevertheless these worlds will be different from the actual world 
(and different from each other) because the physical entities have all been 
mixed and matched with different causal profiles. These differences will 
have nothing to do with how we investigate, confirm, or even express the 
laws of nature that govern these worlds, but they will still be different 
because the physical entities that serve as the relata in these laws will be 
different.
So it seems there is good reason to think physical identity is not 
preserved across counter-nomological worlds. to see why this matters 
regarding C4 consider, again, what Contingency amounts to. It is   the 
claim that the correlation between mental and physical states is 
contingent. In order for Contingency to remain a meaningful claim the 
very same mental states and physical states must come apart in certain 
possible worlds. but when we consider counter-nomological worlds it is 
not obvious whether or not the identity of physical states are preserved. 
Indeed there is good reason to believe that P, the relevant physical 
brain state, does not even exist in PWZ-lAW. but if the identity of P is not 
preserved across counter-nomological worlds then it seems PWZ-lAW 
cannot be used to undermine C4.
Second, PWZ-lAW is a  red herring. even if physical identity were 
preserved across counter-nomological worlds the possibility of PWZ-lAW 
does not have any real bearing on the truth or falsity of epiphenomenalism 
so long as PWZ remains possible. And it is the possibility of PWZ, a possible 
world that is identical to PW@ in every way (including the laws of nature) 
minus the existence of mental states, that establishes epiphenomenalism. 
In other words, the possibility of PWZ-lAW is orthogonal to the central issue. 
What really matters, regarding the truth or falsity of epiphenomenalism 
is the possibility of PWZ (not PWZ-lAW).
Perhaps, in response, one can simply dig in her heels and assert that 
zombie worlds like PWZ are impossible, or at least argue that zombie worlds 
are erroneously described since mental states are causally efficacious 
in PW@. Worlds like PWZ, contrary to the way they are ‘standardly’ 
described, cannot be identical with PW@ in all the physical events that 
occur in them. There will be events that occur in PW@ that do not occur 
in PWZ (and vice versa) due to the presence (or absence) of mental states 
that make a causal difference in the kinds of physical events that occur. 
Zombies simply cannot be behaviorally identical with their conscious 
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counterparts if we assume that mental states make a  causal difference 
in PW@. For example, I might yell ‘ouch’ in PW@ because I am in mental 
state M. That is, M is a casual factor in my yelling ‘ouch’. my zombie twin 
in PWZ, however, will not yell ‘ouch’ since one of the necessary causal 
factors for my yelling ‘ouch’, namely M, is not present in PWZ.
There is no doubt that this move will preserve Contingency and 
undermine C4 but it does so at a price. In order to pursue this strategy 
one would be forced to reject Closure. We must remember that the casual 
efficacy of nonphysical mental states is a  straightforward violation of 
Closure since Closure is the claim that physical events only have physical 
causes. rejecting Closure, however, would be dialectically disastrous 
for proponents of AC. If you recall AC was formulated with naturalistic 
dualists in mind. The central purpose of the argument is to persuade 
naturalistic dualists to become theists. rejecting Closure, however, is 
a move, at least according to moreland, that is unavailable to naturalistic 
dualists since naturalists (in general) are committed to Closure. He 
writes, “most naturalists believe that their worldview requires that all 
entities whatever are either physical or depend on the physical for their 
existence and behavior. one implication of this belief is commitment to 
[Closure].” Given this naturalist commitment it would be dialectically 
useless to undermine C4 by rejecting Closure.
VI. CoNCluSIoN
There is a  tension in AC that can be formulated as a dilemma against 
moreland based on the acceptance or rejection of Contingency. one 
is forced either to accept epiphenomenalism or reject the possibility 
of a  theistic personal explanation for mental states. both options are 
undesirable. It seems, therefore, that AC in its present form cannot be 
used effectively to persuade naturalistic dualists to become theists. 
Perhaps AC can be appropriately revised. This, however, has yet to be 
seen.
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